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Abstract. Norm-enforcement models applied in human societies may serve as 
an inspiration for the design of multi-agent systems. Models for norm-
enforcement in multi-agent systems often focus either on the intra- or inter-
agent level. We propose a combined approach to identify objectives for an  
architecture for self-regulating agents. In this paper we assess how changes on 
the inter-agent level affect the intra-agent level and how a generic BDI architec-
ture IRMA can be adapted for self-regulation. The approach is validated with a 
case study of AEO certification, a European wide customs initiative to secure 
the supply chain while facilitating international trade. 
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1   Introduction 
To make autonomous agents comply with norms, various enforcement mechanisms 
have been proposed. Norms here are defined as standards of behavior that are accept-
able in a society, indicating desirable behaviors that should be carried out, as well as 
undesirable behaviors that should be avoided [14]. Enforcement mechanisms often 
require special ‘observers’ or ‘regulator agents’ that actively monitor the behavior of 
the other agents, and sanction them in case of norm violations. When developing 
norm enforcement mechanisms for multi-agent systems, the modeling is often focused 
on the inter-agent level (between agents). Models aim to construct norm enforcement 
mechanisms by agent interaction. The intra-level (inside the agent) is mainly treated 
as a black box.  We argue that the intra- and inter-agent aspects cannot be viewed 
separately, especially in norm enforcement where external stimuli should motivate an 
agent to adapt its behavior and thereby its internal mechanisms. 
Norm-enforcement models applied in human societies may serve as an inspiration 
for the design of electronic institutions and open agent systems.  An enforcement 
mechanism that is based on an agent’s internal architecture to achieve compliant be-
havior, and does not require additional ‘observers’ is self-regulation.  Self-regulation 
is a control approach in which rule making and enforcement are carried out by the 
agent itself, instead of by the regulator.  Self-regulation is an alternative for direct 
control, when external supervision and enforcement is not possible, ineffective or 
when there is a lack of controlling resources. For example, in an e-institution it might 
be impossible to check all agent actions for compliance in real time. A solution might 
 Towards an Architecture for Self-regulating Agents 321 
 
be to do a code review and determine whether an agent is compliant by design [17]. In 
human societies, programs of self–regulation have been found to contribute to ex-
panded control coverage and greater inspectorial depth [3]. Self-regulation can be 
implemented in various ways, ranging from voluntary self-regulation, where a group 
of agents chooses to regulate themselves, to mandated or enforced self-regulation, 
where a government agency delegates some of its regulative and enforcing tasks to 
the agents subjected to the norm, but retains the supervision [16]. Each model of self-
regulation causes different dependencies among agents and different information 
needs, which imposes different requirements on the agent architecture. 
A specific case of self-regulation is the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) 
program [12]. The AEO program is a European wide customs initiative that aims to 
secure international trade while at the same time reducing the administrative burden 
for companies through the use of self-control. Companies that are trustworthy in the 
context of customs related operations and have a good internal control system may 
apply for the AEO certificate and receive operational benefits from simplified cus-
toms procedures, preferential treatment, and less physical inspections. Companies that 
do not have an AEO certificate remain subject to the current level of customs con-
trols. Participation in the AEO program is voluntary, but demonstrating effective self-
control mechanisms is a necessary requirement.  
Implementing self-regulation as a control mechanism thus results in a redistribu-
tion or delegation of control tasks among the actors. Agents have to adapt their inter-
nal mechanisms to cope with these tasks. We see that changes at the inter-agent level 
affect the intra-level. We therefore propose to use a combined approach to develop an 
architecture which can use self-regulation as a control mechanism for multi-agent 
systems.  The research questions we would like to answer are:  
1. What objectives need to be met by an architecture for self-regulating agents?   
2. How should the existing BDI-agent architecture be adapted for self-regulation?  
We use a combination of frameworks to cover the inter- as well as intra-agent aspects. 
For intra-agent analysis the Intelligent Resource-Bounded Machine Architecture 
(IRMA) [4] is a good starting point, because it is a general BDI architecture [15], 
which is well accepted and forms the basis for more recent agent architectures, such 
as AgentSpeak or 3APL. Software engineering methodology TROPOS [5] provides 
suitable concepts to analyze agents’ dependencies at the inter-agent level.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we analyze the 
difference between direct control and self-regulation using TROPOS. Using this 
analysis we generate objectives for the internal architecture of a self-regulating agent. 
We apply these objectives to IRMA and propose some adaptations (Section 3). Using 
the extended architecture and the TROPOS model, we analyze a case study of AEO 
(Section 4). We examine if our adapted version of the architecture covers the findings 
of the case study.  We identify its suitability and shortcomings. 
2   Inter-agent Analysis  
We first analyze the types of agents involved in regulation, and the dependencies 
between them. To do so we use concepts from the early requirements phase of the 
TROPOS methodology [5], which is derived from the i* framework [18]. The key 
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concepts we use are: actor, goal, plan, resource and dependency. An actor can be an 
autonomous agent that has a goal or strategic interest, based on its organizational role. 
A goal can be satisfied through the execution of a plan, which is an abstract represen-
tation of a way of doing something. A resource can be a physical or informational 
entity. Actors can depend on each other to reach a certain goal, to execute a plan or to 
obtain resources. The agent that depends on another agent is called the depender, the 
agent he depends on is called the dependee. The object which is the subject of the 
dependency relation is called the dependum.  
We first model direct control, where actions of autonomous agents are regulated by 
special regulator agents. After that we analyze self-regulation and assess what should 
change when an autonomous agent internalizes control tasks of the regulator agent. 
2.1   Agents’ Dependencies in Direct Control 
In direct control we have two types of agents: an Actor agent (A) that is carrying out 
an activity and a Regulator agent (R) that is responsible for regulating A’s actions 
such that agent A complies with the norms that are applicable to A. An agent can 
violate the norms through pursuing an illegal goal or by performing an illegitimate 
action. We assume that R has a norm framework from which it derives the set of 
norms tailored to an agent’s specific situation. To regulate A, agent R must have plans 
for executing the following activities: R1 ‘Specify norms for actor', R2 ‘Determine 
control indicators of actor’, R3 ‘Monitor actor’s actions’ and R4 ‘Sanction actor’. R1 
generates a set of norms for A. R uses information about A and A’s actions to select 
the appropriate norms from the norm framework that apply to A’s specific situation. 
R2 determines appropriate ‘control indicators’. A control indicator is the kind of evi-
dence required to demonstrate compliance of a norm, as well as infrastructural re-
quirements to collect that evidence. For example: when a company sends an invoice, 
they make a copy of the invoice and store the copy to be able to check later whether 
all collected payments are correct and complete.  R3 concerns the monitoring per-
formed by R on A’s actions, based on information provided by A about the control 
indicators.  R4 describes the plan of R to sanction A in case of a norm violation. 
Agent A’s model is quite simple, as A is a ‘blind’ agent that has no knowledge about 
the norms or control indicators and can only act. Therefore it is possible that A un-
knowingly engages in an activity that violates a norm that is imposed upon A by R. 
However, we do assume that A remembers action-sanction relations and that it can 
decide to cancel an action that will lead to a sanction.  
Figure 1 shows the results of the dependency analysis for direct control.  
A consequence of this division of tasks, where the regulator is responsible for the 
majority of control tasks, is that it is very labor intensive for the regulator. The regula-
tor needs to specify norm sets and control indicators for all agents and needs to do all 
the verification and auditing. Furthermore the suitability of the rules can be disput-
able. Overregulation can occur when all the characteristics of the individual agents 
and possible exceptions need to be taken into account in the rules. Or rules can be-
come ill fitting when they are supposed to be suitable for the majority of the agents 
but turn out to be compromises, which are not suitable for any individual agent. In 
direct control relations, Actor agents often have little influence on the rules that are 
assigned to them and simply have to adapt to the rules that are given.  
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Fig. 1. TROPOS model of direct control. The actions of an actor (A) are regulated by a regula-
tor (R). Note that arrows depict dependency, not information flow. So to regulate A’s actions, R 
depends on A for information about actor and actions. 
2.2   Agents’ Dependencies in Self-regulation 
For self-regulation we start again with two types of agents: the actor agent (A) and the 
regulator agent (R). In self-regulation several control tasks are delegated from R to A. 
Since A is autonomous, R can never be absolutely certain that A complies. R thus has 
to implement a mechanism to make A regulate itself appropriately. Furthermore,  to 
maintain the power of the regulator to handle non-compliant agents, the sanctioning 
task (R4) remains the regulator’s responsibility.   
We first consider the consequences of the internalization of control tasks by A. 
Plans R1, R2 and R3 may be internalized by agent A as plans: A1 ‘Specify norms’, 
A2 ‘Determine control indicators’ and A3 ‘Monitor actions’. A1 specifies norms 
based on a norm framework which originates from R. This entails a new dependency 
between A and R: A now depends on R for communicating the norm framework. 
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When the norm specification is done by A, A is also supposed to be able to differenti-
ate between norm violations and norm compliance. A therefore no longer depends for 
information about violations and permissions on R, but has to do it himself. A2 de-
fines control indicators about A’s actions, based on the norms defined in A1. A3 de-
scribes the monitoring actions of A which it performs in the context of the control 
indicators from plan A2. The plans A1, A2, and A3 together, should support A to act 
in compliance with the norms.  The acts of A in turn affect the nature of the control 
actions. If A starts doing different activities the control indicators may become less 
effective and A therefore has to determine new control indicators that cover the 
norms. For example, if A replaces the process of sending paper invoices to its cus-
tomers by sending electronic invoices, new control indicators are required: e.g. log 
files and encryption proof instead of paper copies of the invoice. 
 
Fig. 2. TROPOS model of self-regulation, control tasks of the regulator are internalized by the 
actor agent 
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Now we describe the consequences of A’s internalization of the control tasks of 
R’s goals and plans. Since A now has to control its own actions, the goal of R to regu-
late A’s actions is supposed to be met by the control activities of A. To determine if 
this delegation of control is effective, R has adopted a new goal which is to regulate 
the control activities of A.  To reach this goal, R also has defined a new plan (R5), 
which describes the activities of R to monitor and evaluate A’s control actions. Note 
that R now depends on A for information about its control activities instead of its 
activities, so R5 is a kind of meta-control plan. In auditing practice, R5 refers to a 
system-based audit, were the focus is the internal control system instead of on busi-
ness transactions. Before an agent can enter a self-regulative relation, it has to provide 
an authenticated control architecture or control script to the regulator. 
A similar solution would work for a code review, mentioned in the introduction. 
An electronic marketplace, for example, may want to provide assurance that its mem-
bers generally comply with the norms. In addition to monitoring and sanctioning 
violations when they occur, the institution can require the owner of an agent to pro-
vide documentation and programming code before an agent is allowed into the envi-
ronment. In this documentation the owner must make explicit how the agents internal 
control architecture assures compliance to the norms defined by the marketplace. 
Using this evidence, the institution can verify (up to a point) whether the agent is 
compliant by design, compare [17]. Such a verification can be automated, but that is 
not necessary, as the review takes place off-line.  
Figure 2 shows dependencies between agents A and R engaged in self-regulation. 
When we compare direct control with self-regulation we see that A internalizes 
some of R’s control activities on A. New information resources are gathered to be 
used within the control activities. Also new goals evolve and lead to the adoption of 
new plans. Corresponding new dependencies between R and A develop for the acqui-
sition of these new information resources.  
These inter-agent changes are reflected in a number of objectives for intra-agent 
architectures. Summarizing the objectives, self-regulating agent must have at least the 
capabilities to:  
1. Detect, internalize and store the norms which are applicable in the environment,  
2. Translate norms into measurable control indicators, and  
3. Monitor, detect and mitigate possible norm violations.  
In the next section we show the internal architecture of the actor in self-regulation. 
3   Inter-agent Analysis 
We now analyze how the new tasks and dependencies revealed by the TROPOS mod-
els will affect an agent’s internal architecture. We acknowledge that these tasks are 
complex normative tasks. We use the Intelligent Resource-Bounded Machine Archi-
tecture (IRMA) [4]. The architecture is a BDI architecture where the intentions are 
structured into plans. A plan can be a plan that an agent has actually adopted, or a 
plan-as-recipe that is stored into the plan library. Plan options are proposed as a result 
of means-end reasoning or by the opportunity analyzer. The opportunity analyzer 
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detects changes in the environment and determines new opportunities, based on the 
agent’s desires. The options are filtered through a compatibility filter, that checks the 
options to determine compatibility with the agent’s existing plans, and a filter over-
ride mechanism, in which the conditions are defined under which (portions) of plans 
need to be suspended and replaced by another option. The deliberation process deter-
mines the best option on the basis of current beliefs and desires. 
Consider an autonomous agent that likes to achieve a certain goal. The agent has 
already several plans of action available (in its plan-library) to reach this goal. Before 
deliberating on a plan, the agent engages in a filtering process. This process constrains 
the agent’s possible plans to plans that can be completed given its available (sub) 
plans in the plan library, its beliefs and desires. The agent chooses from this selection 
the best plan, given its beliefs and desires, and executes the plan. Figure 3 shows our 
extension of the IRMA architecture, adapted for self-regulation. Norm related adapta-
tions are shown in grey and dotted lines.  The ovals in the figure are information 
stores (repositories) and the rectangles are process modules.  
Within IRMA we like to implement the processes and information stores that are 
needed for self-regulation.  A self-regulating agent needs to internalize certain control 
activities to control its actions. The activities are: ‘specify norms’ (A1), ‘determine 
control indicators’ (A2), and ‘monitor actions’ (A3). These control activities require 
input from the agent’s actions, and the actions in turn are influenced by the norms. 
We first analyze which IRMA modules are possibly affected by normative reasoning. 
Norms can impact the information stores or processes of the architecture. A norm 
can be implemented in plans and function as a threshold to restrict the outcome. For 
example, a thermostat function that tries to keep the room heated at a certain tempera-
ture. Norms can also restrict the possible set of plans. Plans that violate a norm are no 
longer stored in the plan library. Or in means-end reasoning: there are illegal plans in 
the plan library but they are not considered as appropriate options to reach a goal; 
such plans are temporarily ‘suppressed’, as in [14]. Norms can also prevent the actual 
execution of a plan. For example, a person can plan to rob a bank, but decide not to do 
so at the last moment. 
Besides that, norms affect the beliefs. After all, agents are expected to know the 
general norms. Beliefs also affect the norms, in the sense that beliefs about the con-
text help to identify applicable norms. An agent may also realize, based on its beliefs, 
that it is acting in violation with the norms. Or, an agent realizes that due to a change 
in activities certain norms are no longer applicable and new norms must be incorpo-
rated. Whenever an agent adopts a new norm, this must be known (believed). 
Norms are also related to the desires of an agent. An agent’s desires may violate 
the norms. For example, an agent may desire a handbag that is made of the skin of a 
protected snake. A norm is that killing a protected animal is illegal. If norms are in-
cluded in the compatibility filter, an agent can check if an option is compatible with 
its norms. If norms are part of the filter override mechanism, non-compliance can be a 
condition under which an agent must reconsider its plans. Both implementations make 
it possible for an agent to decide not to consider a plan option of buying a snake skin 
handbag. The opportunity analyzer may use the norms and beliefs to search for an 
alternative, such as a fake snake skin handbag. 
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Fig. 3. A reasoning component for self-regulating agents adapted from [4]. Norm related 
adaptations are shown in grey and with dotted lines.  
We find that norms can impact all components of the architecture. To assure con-
sistent norm application we propose a central storage for norms similar to what the 
plan library is for plans. Activity A1 updates the norm library according to the beliefs 
of the agent.  Only norms that are considered to be applicable to the agent’s specific 
situation are included. To make an agent aware of a norm (violation) we connect the 
norm library with the reasoner module that is attached to the beliefs. If an agent then 
reasons about its beliefs, it will take the relevant norms into account. Beliefs about a 
norm (violation) can be used as input for the means-end reasoner, opportunity ana-
lyzer and the deliberation process. Besides that, the agent may use its knowledge 
about norms to determine the control indicators of A2. We consider the filtering proc-
ess the best location to implement the control indicators.  Beliefs about norms are 
already included in the other reasoning processes. The filtering process and reasoning 
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thus together consider (non-) compliant behavior. We think that the majority of the 
control indicators should be embedded in the compatibility filter and only severe 
violations should be handled by the filter override mechanism. Otherwise it could 
happen that the filtering is too strict. The monitoring in A3 is handled through a com-
parison of the beliefs about the data on the indicators with the norms. Based on results 
from this analysis, controls in the filtering process may be adapted. Figure 3 shows a 
version of the IRMA architecture specifically adapted for self-regulation.   
 Our approach of embedding norms into the filter override mechanism is compara-
ble with the framework that is proposed by [14]. Norms can also be implemented into 
the goal generation mechanism as was done in the BOID architecture [6].  In BOID 
one can distinguish two kinds of goals: internal motivations (desires), representing 
individual wants or needs, and external motivations (obligations) to model social 
commitments and norms [6]. All these potential goals may conflict. To resolve con-
flicts among the sets of beliefs, obligations, intentions and desires, a priority order is 
needed. In the BOID, such a (partial) order is provided by the agent type. In [8] we 
discuss the use of values for goal conflict resolution.  
Note that we have so far only considered adaptations to the agent architecture 
based on a conception of norms as a kind of filtering: actions, plans or goals which 
might lead to violation are filtered out or suppressed. Instead of filtering, we can also 
consider norm adoption [9,11]. Here, a norm is simply adopted as a goal. The rest of 
the architecture will then ensure compliance. Note that adopted norms will often cor-
respond to so called maintenance goals: goals to make sure that some desirable state 
of affairs subsists or that an undesirable state is avoided, by contrast to achievement 
goals, which are about reaching a new state of affairs. Architectures for dealing with 
maintenance goals are discussed in [13]. 
4   Case Study: AEO Certification 
We illustrate and validate our models by analyzing a specific case of self-regulation: 
AEO certification. The case study results are based on document analysis and a series 
of semi-structured interviews with experts from Dutch Tax and Customs Administra-
tion, held in the period of May till November 2009. Meeting notes were made by the 
authors and verified by interview partners. Intermediate results of the case study were 
validated in a one-day workshop with domain experts.  
An Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) can be defined as a company that is in-
control of its own business processes, and hence is considered trustworthy throughout 
the EU in the context of its customs related operations [12]. Typically, modern enter-
prise information systems (ERP, CRM etc.) play an essential role for companies to be 
in-control. AEO’s will receive several benefits in customs handling, such as a “Green 
Lane” treatment with a reduced number of inspections. This can lead to considerable 
cost-reductions for businesses. For non-certified enterprises customs will continue to 
carry out the traditional supervision. Customs can direct their efforts towards non-
certified companies to increase the security of international supply chains, while at the 
same time reducing the administrative burden for AEOs. 
To qualify as AEO, a company must meet a number of criteria, which are de-
scribed in the community customs code and the AEO guidelines [12], developed by 
the European Commission. Part of the application procedure is a self-assessment on 
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the quality of the company’s internal control system for aspects that are relevant to 
the type of AEO certificate (‘Customs simplifications’, ‘Security and safety’ or 
‘Combined’) [12]. The company’s approach and the results of the self-assessment are 
inspected by customs. Customs officers determine whether the self-assessment is 
performed well and whether the results indicate that a company is able to control its 
business processes such that they contribute to a secure supply chain. If this is the 
case and other criteria are met (e.g. solvency, no known tax evasions etc.) an AEO 
certificate is issued by the customs office. Next we focus on the self-assessment task. 
4.1   The Self-assessment Task 
The company’s first task is to collect information related to the specific nature of the 
company to focus the self-assessment. This step is called ‘Understanding the busi-
ness’. The next step is to identify (potential) risks to which the business is exposed 
using the AEO guidelines, which provide an overview of general risk and attention 
points. The company determines which sections are important according to the nature 
of the business activities. A company then has to identify, what risks affect the supply 
chain’s safety, and are therefore of interest of the customs authorities. So the company 
takes over the customs’ task of risk identification.  For example, computer compo-
nents are valuable goods, which are subject to theft. Trading valuable goods requires 
more security measures, than, say, trading in a mass product like fertilizer. However, 
some ingredients of fertilizer may be used to assemble explosives, leading to a differ-
ent set of risks. 
A company must then assess if appropriate internal control measures are taken to 
mitigate these risks. The vulnerability of a company to threats depends on its current 
control measures. Control measures either reduce the likelihood, by dealing with 
vulnerabilities (preventative controls), or reduce the impact (detective and corrective 
controls). A robust system of controls is thus able to prevent, detect and correct 
threats. A robust system of controls should also monitor its own functioning.  For 
risks that are not controlled, additional measures may be implemented or the risk is 
“accepted”. Risks can be accepted, if the likelihood of a threat is limited and the risk 
is partially covered, or if the costs for complete coverage are very high. 
The company must show how its risk management contributes to its being trust-
worthy. In addition, the company must evaluate whether the proposed measures are 
implemented effectively. To provide some guidance on what is considered ‘effective 
implementation’ customs refer to the COSO internal control guidelines. COSO is a 
general framework for risk management and internal control [10]. The scores range 
from 0 “no control measures in place”, 1 “internal control is ad hoc and unorganized”, 
2 “internal control has a structured approach”, 3 “internal control is documented and 
known”, 4 “internal control is subject to internal audits and evaluation” until 5 “inter-
nal control measures are integrated into the business processes and continuously 
evaluated”. This scoring provides the customs with an indication of the maturity level 
of the company’s self-controlling abilities.   
4.2   Case Analysis 
In the AEO case study we see the implementation of tasks A1, A2, and A3 at the 
company’s side. A company has to define a control system appropriate to handle its 
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specific risks. The company therefore translates the general AEO guidelines into 
norms that are applicable in its own practice and circumstances (compatible with A1). 
Thereby a company determines parameters to monitor and control its business proc-
esses (A2). A company with a control system of a high maturity level monitors its 
actions (A3) through internal audits and controls that are integrated in the processes. 
The customs replace their traditional controls of the company’s processes (R1,R2,R3) 
with an assessment of the company’s self-regulating capabilities and control ac-
tions (R5). To check the reliability of the company’s controls, customs may still take 
samples of business transactions, but these will now be much more focused, for in-
stance on areas with an increased risk. To make R5 and the delegation of tasks A1, 
A2, A3 more manageable, we see that additional guidelines and principles must be 
formulated. An example of such additional guidelines is the set of AEO guidelines 
specified by the EU, indicating examples of risk areas for different domains. Another 
example is given by local customs directives. For instance, the Dutch customs refer to 
the COSO maturity levels as a way of objectively measuring ‘effective implementa-
tion’ of control measures. Such additional guidelines are needed for both implement-
ing and auditing control systems. They help to specify under what circumstances a 
company can be said to be ‘in control’ of safety and security. 
We also observe dependencies regarding information resources. The company de-
pends on abstract norms (e.g. the AEO Guidelines) provided by the customs, which 
they try to apply to themselves as they believe the customs would do. The customs on 
the other hand depend on the company for information about their control system. For 
instance, why have they chosen for a certain implementation of the norms? Why have 
they decided to accept a certain risk, and not take additional control measures? 
The AEO case provides us with a new approach to control that could also be ap-
plied to a multi-agent system. It shows that norm enforcement is a task that can be 
distributed among various types of agents. Furthermore we learned that self-
regulation only works under certain conditions and that delegating control tasks is not 
simple. In general companies find it difficult to do a self-assessment as they do not 
know what customs expect from them (open norms). The translation of the abstract 
AEO guidelines into company specific norms turns out to be hard. For companies it is 
unclear when they have taken sufficient measures. Companies sometimes expect 
customs to indicate what is sufficient: “A fence for a chemical company should be X 
meters high”.  Even for customs such knowledge is often only implicitly available as 
expert knowledge that is difficult to externalize and make accessible for companies. 
In the AEO case, implemented measures are based on the risks in the environment. 
This corresponds to our observation in the architecture that norms depend on the be-
liefs. In the AEO case, we find both the adoption of new policies and procedures 
(norm adoption), as well as a redesign of existing business processes (norm filtering). 
Mature companies have their controls integrated in the business processes, and have 
regular audits to check the functioning of controls (reflective capabilities).  
Summarizing, we can say that the internal control system of a company can be seen 
as the implementation of an architecture for self-regulation. In the AEO case, customs 
must provide a kind of quality assessment of this control architecture (system based 
audit), rather than verifying business transactions. This fundamental change in the role 
of customs, shows a transformation from operational control to meta-control. There-
fore issues like trust and integrity now play a role at two levels. First there is the trust-
worthiness of the company’s management, or in the case of an electronic institution, of 
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the agent owner. In the AEO case, we find that historical indicators of fraud always 
lead to a rejection of the certificate. In electronic institutions a rule could be that agents 
from proven untrustworthy owners are denied access to the community. Second, there 
is the reliability of the control system or agent architecture itself. If the control system 
is not reliable, it cannot be used to take over the delegated control tasks. Therefore the 
company can’t function as a trusted partner of customs. Electronic institutions may 
also require that agent behavior is controlled to assure the correctness of the transac-
tions. In that case, the owner of must prove that the agent is compliant by design. Such 
a proof depends on the internal architecture of the agent.    
5   Discussion 
We use a combination of TROPOS and IRMA as a means to identify requirements for 
self-regulating agents at the intra- and inter-agent level. We do not claim that these 
are the best approaches currently available, there are some limitations.   
The most important limitation of IRMA as the internal architecture is that it is not 
reflective. By this we mean that agents cannot learn from their mistakes. When the 
agent finds that a plan leads to a norm violation it is only able to cancel this plan as a 
possible option. It lacks mechanisms to delete or change such plans in a plan library. 
Desires that violate norms cannot be changed either. The agent therefore keeps pro-
posing violating plans and desires. Since norms are context dependent it is quite com-
plex to differentiate violating plans from non-violating plans. Plans that are allowed in 
one situation may be a violation under different circumstances. An adaption of the 
planning mechanism is needed.       
Second, there seems to be a fundamental problem in the delegation of control: of-
ten it is not clear how to communicate the delegated norms from the regulator to the 
actor. For companies it is difficult to interpret and implement the EU guidelines. 
Should customs and companies implement a communication protocol, a shared vo-
cabulary or procedures such that they can more effectively communicate information? 
How should a company make its internal control system available to customs, such 
that they can determine the quality of a control system in a specific context with lim-
ited expert knowledge? These questions have to be answered by a detailed study of 
norm communication, both in practice, and for multi-agent systems.  
Third, our case study reveals issues which may inspire the development of norm 
enforcement mechanisms for multi-agent systems. Open norms and forms of self–
regulation enable heterogeneous agents to enter environments as the entrance  
requirements (open norms) leave room for specific implementations (control architec-
tures). In particular, it suggests how agents can be verified to be ‘compliant by de-
sign’ before entering into an agent environment. Agents have to map their control 
architecture to the norm framework of the environment. The communication problem 
in the case emphasizes the need for well defined norm frameworks. Norm frameworks 
should be abstract enough to allow agents to enter an environment and specific 
enough to support compliance and enforcement of the norms. However, exactly how 
to translate such ideas depends on the particular set-up of the multi-agent system. In 
most cases, there will be a large role for the human owner of the agent, similar to the 
role of management.  They must provide the evidence to demonstrate that they are ‘in 
control’ regarding compliance.  
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6   Conclusions and Further Research  
In this paper we have argued that, with regard to norms, the macro-level definition of 
tasks and dependencies in a multi-agent system and the internal architecture of agents 
are crucially interconnected. A combined approach, that analyses the inter- (between 
agents) and intra-agent level (inside agents), was suitable to identify objectives for an 
architecture for self-regulation. We identified key processes and their influence on the 
dependencies between agents and the internal agent architecture. The models provide 
an insight in the differences in requirements for direct controlled agents and self-
regulating agents. The analysis also points out the limitations of some well-known 
existing approaches. IRMA lacks reflective capabilities and is therefore not sufficient 
to model a truly self-regulating agent: an agent that is able to learn from its mistakes. 
In [8] we look in more detail at various cognitive architectures and how they account 
for compliance and norm adoption.  Also unaddressed were aspects of norm commu-
nication. For two agents to engage in self-regulation relation, they must be able to 
communicate the norms effectively. Since the agents are autonomous we cannot sim-
ply assume that both agents use similar vocabularies or protocols [7]. So a solution for 
norm communication should take the agent’s autonomy into account. One of our 
current research projects examines the use of argumentation theory [1] for norm im-
plementation and communication. Future research thus concerns the role of reflection 
for normative behavior and norm communication.  We hope to specify our ideas more 
formally in a declarative agent architecture (e.g. based on [13]). This will allow agent-
based simulation of the regulatory process. We are also interested in the evolution 
process from direct control to self-regulation. 
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